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ABSTRACT
We present a new method for black-box adversarial attack. Unlike previous meth-
ods that combined transfer-based and scored-based methods by using the gradient
or initialization of a surrogate white-box model, this new method tries to learn a
low-dimensional embedding using a pretrained model, and then performs efficient
search within the embedding space to attack an unknown target network. The
method produces adversarial perturbations with high level semantic patterns that
are easily transferable. We show that this approach can greatly improve the query
efficiency of black-box adversarial attack across different target network architec-
tures. We evaluate our approach on MNIST, ImageNet and Google Cloud Vision
API, resulting in a significant reduction on the number of queries. We also attack
adversarially defended networks on CIFAR10 and ImageNet, where our method
not only reduces the number of queries, but also improves the attack success rate.
1 INTRODUCTION
The wide adoption of neural network models in modern applications has caused major security
concerns, as such models are known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples that can fool neural
networks to make wrong predictions (Szegedy et al., 2014). Methods to attack neural networks can
be divided into two categories based on whether the parameters of the neural network are assumed to
be known to the attacker: white-box attack and black-box attack. There are several approaches to find
adversarial examples for black-box neural networks. The transfer-based attack methods first pretrain
a source model and then generate adversarial examples using a standard white-box attack method on
the source model to attack an unknown target network (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Madry et al., 2018;
Carlini & Wagner, 2017; Papernot et al., 2016a). The score-based attack requires a loss-oracle, which
enables the attacker to query the target network at multiple points to approximate its gradient. The
attacker can then apply the white-box attack techniques with the approximated gradient (Chen et al.,
2017; Ilyas et al., 2018a; Tu et al., 2018).
A major problem of the transfer-based attack is that it can not achieve very high success rate. And
transfer-based attack is weak in targeted attack. On the contrary, the success rate of score-based attack
has only small gap to the white-box attack but it requires many queries. Thus, it is natural to combine
the two black-box attack approaches, so that we can take advantage of a pretrained white-box source
neural network to perform more efficient search to attack an unknown target black-box model.
In fact, in the recent NeurIPS 2018 Adversarial Vision Challenge (Brendel et al., 2018), many teams
transferred adversarial examples from a source network as the starting point to carry out black-box
boundary attack (Brendel et al., 2017). NAttack also used a regression network as initialization
in the score-based attack (Li et al., 2019a). The transferred adversarial example could be a good
starting point that lies close to the decision boundary for the target network and accelerate further
optimization. P-RGF (Cheng et al., 2019) used the gradient information from the source model
to accelerate searching process. However, gradient information is localized and sometimes it is
misleading. In this paper, we push the idea of using a pretrained white-box source network to guide
black-box attack significantly further, by proposing a method called TRansferable EMbedding based
Black-box Attack (TREMBA). TREMBA contains two stages: (1) train an encoder-decoder that
can effectively generate adversarial perturbations for the source network with a low-dimensional
embedding space; (2) apply NES (Natural Evolution Strategy) of (Wierstra et al., 2014) to the
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low-dimensional embedding space of the pretrained generator to search adversarial examples for the
target network. TREMBA uses global information of the source model, capturing high level semantic
adversarial features that are insensitive to different models. Unlike noise-like perturbations, such
perturbations would have much higher transferablity across different models. Therefore we could
gain query efficiency by performing queries in the embedding space.
We note that there have been a number of earlier works on using generators to produce adversarial
perturbations in the white-box setting (Baluja & Fischer, 2018; Xiao et al., 2018; Wang & Yu, 2019).
While black-box attacks were also considered there, they focused on training generators with dynamic
distillation. These early approaches required many queries to fine-tune the classifier for different
target networks, which may not be practical for real applications. While our approach also relies on
a generator, we train it as an encoder-decoder that produces a low-dimensional embedding space.
By applying a standard black-box attack method such as NES on the embedding space, adversarial
perturbations can be found efficiently for a target model.
It is worth noting that the embedding approach has also been used in AutoZOOM (Tu et al., 2018).
However, it only trained the autoencoder to reconstruct the input, and it did not take advantage of
the information of a pretrained network. Although it also produces structural perturbations, these
perturbations are usually not suitable for attacking regular networks and sometimes its performance
is even worse than directly applying NES to the images (Cheng et al., 2019; Guo et al., 2019).
TREMBA, on the other hand, tries to learn an embedding space that can efficiently generate adversarial
perturbations for a pretrained source network. Compared to AutoZOOM, our new method produces
adversarial perturbation with high level semantic features that could hugely affect arbitrary target
networks, resulting in significantly lower number of queries.
We summarize our contributions as follows:
1. We propose TREMBA, an attack method that explores a novel way to utilize the information
of a pretrained source network to improve the query efficiency of black-box attack on a
target network.
2. We show that TREMBA can produce adversarial perturbations with high level semantic
patterns, which are effective across different networks, resulting in much lower queries on
MNIST and ImageNet especially for the targeted attack that has low transferablity.
3. We demonstrate that TREMBA can be applied to SOTA defended models (Madry et al.,
2018; Xie et al., 2018). Compared with other black-box attacks, TREMBA increases success
rate by approximately 10% while reduces the number of queries by more than 50%.
2 RELATED WORKS
There have been a vast literature on adversarial examples. We will cover the most relevant topics
including white-box attack, black-box attack and defense methods.
White-Box Attack White-box attack requires the full knowledge of the target model. It was first
discovered by (Szegedy et al., 2014) that adversarial examples could be found by solving an opti-
mization problem with L-BFGS (Nocedal, 1980). Later on, other methods were proposed to find
adversarial examples with improved success rate and efficiency (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Kurakin
et al., 2016; Papernot et al., 2016b; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016). More recently, it was shown that
generators can also construct adversarial noises with high success rate (Xiao et al., 2018; Baluja &
Fischer, 2018).
Black-Box Attack Black-box attack can be divided into three categories: transfer-based, score-based
and decision-based. It is well known that adversaries have high transferablity across different networks
(Papernot et al., 2016a). Transfer-based methods generate adversarial noises on a source model and
then transfer it to an unknown target network. It is known that targeted attack is harder than un-
targeted attack for transfer-based methods, and using an ensemble of source models can improve the
success rate (Liu et al., 2016). Score-based attack assumes that the attacker can query the output scores
of the target network. The attacker usually uses sampling methods to approximate the true gradient
(Chen et al., 2017; Ilyas et al., 2018a; Li et al., 2019a; Chen et al., 2018). AutoZOOM tried to improve
the query efficiency by reducing the sampling space with a bilinear transformation or an autoencoder
(Tu et al., 2018). (Ilyas et al., 2018b) incorporated data and time prior to accelerate attacking. In
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contrast to the gradient based method, (Moon et al., 2019) used combinatorial optimization to achieve
good efficiency. In decision-based attack, the attacker only knows the output label of the classifier.
Boundary attack and its variants are very powerful in this setting (Brendel et al., 2017; Dong et al.,
2019). In NeutIPS 2018 Adversarial Vision Challenge (Brendel et al., 2018), some teams combined
transfer-based attack and decision-based attack in their attacking methods (Brunner et al., 2018). And
in a similar spirit, NAttack also used a regression network as initialization in score-based attack (Li
et al., 2019a). Gradient information from the surrogate model could also be used to accelerate the
scored-based attack (Cheng et al., 2019) .
Defense Methods Several methods have been proposed to overcome the vulnerability of neural
networks. Gradient masking based methods add non-differential operations in the model, interrupt-
ing the backward pass of gradients. However, they are vulnerable to adversarial attacks with the
approximated gradient (Athalye et al., 2018; Li et al., 2019a). Adversarial training is the SOTA
method that can be used to improve the robustness of neural networks. Adversarial training is a
minimax game. The outside minimizer performs regular training of the neural network, and the inner
maximizer finds a perturbation of the input to attack the network. The inner maximization process
can be approximated with FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015), PGD (Madry et al., 2018), adversarial
generator (Wang & Yu, 2019) etc. Moreover, feature denoising can improve the robustness of neural
networks on ImageNet (Xie et al., 2018).
3 BLACK-BOX ADVERSARIAL ATTACK WITH GENERATOR
Consider a DNN classifier F (x). Let x ∈ [0, 1]dim(x) be an input, and let F (x) be the output vector
obtained before the softmax layer. We denote F (x)i as the i-th component for the output vector and
y as the label for the input. For un-targeted attack, our goal is to find a small perturbation δ such that
the classifier predicts the wrong label, i.e. argmax F (x+ δ) 6= y. And for targeted attack, we want
the classifier to predicts the target label t, i.e. argmax F (x+ δ) = t. The perturbation δ is usually
bounded by `p norm: ‖δ‖p ≤ ε, with a small ε > 0.
Adversarial perturbations often have high transferablity across different DNNs. Given a white-box
source DNN Fs with known architecture and parameters, we can transfer its white-box adversarial
perturbation δs to a black-box target DNN Ft with reasonably good success rate. It is known that
even if x+ δs fails to be an adversarial example, δs can still act as a good starting point for searching
adversarial examples using a score-based attack method. This paper shows that the information of Fs
can be further utilized to train a generator, and performing search on its embedding space leads to
more efficient black-box attacks of an unknown target network Ft.
3.1 GENERATING ADVERSARIAL PERTURBATIONS WITH GENERATOR
Adversarial perturbations can be generated by a generator network G. We explicitly divide the
generator into two parts: an encoder E and a decoder D. The encoder takes the origin input x and
output a latent vector z = E(x), where dim(z)  dim(x). The decoder takes z as the input and
outputs an adversarial perturbation δ = ε tanh(D(z)) with dim(δ) = dim(x). In our new method,
we will train the generator G so that δ = ε tanh(G(x)) can fool the source network Fs.
Suppose we have a training set {(x1, y1) , . . . , (xn, yn)}, where xi denotes the input and yi denotes
its label. For un-targeted attack, we train the desired generator by minimizing the hinge loss used in
the C&W attack (Carlini & Wagner, 2017):
Luntarget(xi, yi) = max
(
Fs(ε tanh(G(xi)) + xi)yi −max
j 6=yi
Fs(ε tanh(G(xi)) + xi)j ,−κ
)
, (1)
And for targeted, we use
Ltarget(xi, t) = max
(
max
j 6=t
Fs(ε tanh(G(xi)) + xi)j − Fs(ε tanh(G(xi)) + xi)t,−κ
)
, (2)
where t denotes the targeted class and κ is the margin parameter that can be used to adjust transfer-
ability of the generator. A higher value of κ leads to higher transferability to other models (Carlini
& Wagner, 2017). We focus on `∞ norm in this work. By adding point-wise tanh function to an
unnormalized output D(z), and scaling it with ε, δ = ε tanh(D(z)) is already bounded as ‖δ‖∞ < ε.
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Therefore we employ this transformation, so that we do not need to impose the infinity norm con-
straint explicitly. While hinge loss is employed in this paper, we believe other loss functions such the
cross entropy loss will also work.
3.2 SEARCH OVER LATENT SPACE WITH NES
Given a new black-box DNN classifier Ft(x), for which we can only query its output at any given point
x. As in (Ilyas et al., 2018a; Wierstra et al., 2014), we can employ NES to approximate the gradient of
a properly defined surrogate loss in order to find an adversarial example. Denote the surrogate loss by
L, rather than calculating∇δL(x+δ, y) directly, NES update δ by using∇δEω∼N (δ,σ2)[L(x+ω, y)],
which can be transformed into Eω∼N (δ,σ2)[L(x+ ω, y)∇ω log(N (ω|δ, σ2))]. The expectation can
be approximated by taking finite samples. And we could use the following equation to iteratively
update δ:
δt+1 =
∏
[−ε,ε]
(δt − η · sign(1
b
b∑
k=1
L(x+ ωk, y)∇ logN (ωk|δt, σ2))), (3)
where η is the learning rate, b is the minibatch sample size, ωk is the sample from the gaussian
distribution and
∏
[−ε,ε] represents a clipping operation, which projects δ onto the `∞ ball. The sign
function provides an approximation of the gradient, which has been widely used in adversarial attack
(Ilyas et al., 2018a; Madry et al., 2018). However, it is observed that more effective attacks can be
obtained by removing the sign function (Li et al., 2019b). Therefore in this work, we remove the sign
function from Eqn (3) and directly use the estimated gradient.
Instead of performing search on the input space, TREMBA performs search on the embedding space
z. The generator G explores the weakness of the source DNN Fs so that D produces perturbations
that can effective attack Fs. For a different unknown target network Ft, we show that our method can
still generate perturbations leading to more effective attack of Ft. Given an input x and its label y,
we choose a starting point z0 = E(x). The gradient of zt given by NES can be estimated as:
∇ztL(x+ ε tanh(D(zt)), y) ≈ ∇ztEν∼N (zt,σ2) [L(x+ ε tanh(D(ν)), y)] (4)
≈ 1
b
b∑
k=1
L(x+ ε tanh(D(νk)), y)∇zt logN (νk|zt, σ2).
where νk is the sample from the gaussian distribution N (zt, σ2). Moreover, zt is updated with
stochastic gradient descent. The detailed procedure is presented in Algorithm 1. We do not need to
do projection explicitly since δ already satisfies ‖δ‖∞ < ε.
Next we shall briefly explain why applying NES on the embedding space z can accelerate the search
process. Adversarial examples can be viewed as a distribution lying around a given input. Usually
this distribution is concentrated on some small regions, making the search process relatively slow.
After training on the source network, the adversarial perturbations of TREMBA would have high
level semantic patterns that are likely to be adversarial patterns of the target network. Therefore
searching over z is like searching adversarial examples in a lower dimensional space containing
likely adversarial patterns. The distribution of adversarial perturbations in this space is much less
concentrated. It is thus much easier to find effective adversarial patterns in the embedding space.
4 EXPERIMENTS
We evaluated the number of queries versus success rate of TREMBA on undefended network in
two datasets: MNIST (LeCun et al., 1998) and ImageNet (Russakovsky et al., 2015). Moreover, we
evaluated the efficiency of our method on adversarially defended networks in CIFAR10 (Krizhevsky
& Hinton, 2009) and ImageNet. We also attacked Google Cloud Vision API to show TREMBA can
generalize to truly black-box model.1 We used the hinge loss from Eqn 1 and 2 as the surrogate loss
for un-targeted and targeted attack respectively.
We compared TREMBA to four methods: (1) NES: Method introduced by (Ilyas et al., 2018a),
but without the sign function for reasons explained earlier. (2) Trans-NES: Take an adversarial
1Our code is available at https://github.com/TransEmbedBA/TREMBA
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Algorithm 1 Black-Box adversarial attack on the embedding space
Input:
Target Network Ft; Input x and its label y or the target class t; Encoder E ; Decoder D; Standard
deviation σ; Learning rate η; Sample size b; Iterations T ; Bound for adversarial perturbation ε
Output: Adversarial perturbation δ
1: z0 = E(x)
2: for t = 1 to T do
3: Sample Gaussian noise ν1, ν2, · · · , νb ∼ N (zt−1, σ2)
4: Calculate Li = Luntarget(x, y) or Ltarget(x, t)
5: Update zt = zt−1 − ηb
∑b
i=1 Li∇zt−1 logN (νi|zt−1, σ2)
6: end for
7: return δ = ε tanh(D(zT ))
perturbation generated by PGD or FGSM on the source model to initialize NES. (3) AutoZOOM:
Attack target network with an unsupervised autoencoder described in (Tu et al., 2018). For fair
comparisons with other methods, the strategy of choosing sample size was removed. (4) P-RGF:
Prior-guided random gradient-free method proposed in (Cheng et al., 2019). The P-RGFD(λ∗) version
was compared. We also combined P-RGF with initialization from Trans-NESPGD to form a more
efficient method for comparison, denoted by Trans-P-RGF.
Since different methods achieve different success rates, we need to compare their efficiency at
different levels of success rate. For method i with success rate si, the average number of queries is qi
for all success examples. Let q∗ denote the upper limit of queries, we modified the average number
of queries to be q∗i = [(maxj sj − si) · q∗ + si · qi]/maxj sj , which unified the level of success rate
and treated queries of failure examples as the upper limit on the number of queries. Average queries
sometimes could be misleading due to the the heavy tail distribution of queries. Therefore we plot
the curve of success rate at different query levels to show the detailed behavior of different attacks.
The upper limit on the number of queries was set to 50000 for all datasets, which already gave very
high success rate for nearly all the methods. Only correctly classified images were counted towards
success rate and average queries. And to fairly compare these methods, we chose the sample size to
be the same for all methods. We also added momentum and learning decay for optimization. And we
counted the queries as one if its starting point successfully attacks the target classifier. The learning
rate was fine-tuned for all algorithms. We listed the hyperparameters and architectures of generators
and classifiers in Appendix B and C.
4.1 BLACK-BOX ATTACK ON MNIST
We trained four neural networks on MNIST, denoted by ConvNet1, ConvNet1*, ConvNet2 and FCNet.
ConvNet1* and ConvNet1 have the same architecture but different parameters. All the network
achieved about 99% accuracy. The generator G was trained on ConvNet1* using all images from the
training set. Each attack was tested on images from the MNIST test set. The limit of `∞ was ε = 0.2.
We performed un-targeted attack on MNIST. Table 1 lists the success rate and the average queries.
Although the success rate of TREMBA is slightly lower than Trans-NES in ConvNet1 and FCNet,
their success rate are already close to 100% and TREMBA achieves about 50% reduction of queries
compared with other attacks. In contrast to efficient attack on ImageNet, P-RGF and Trans-P-RGF
behaves very bad on MNIST. Figure 4.1 shows that TREMBA consistently achieves higher success
rate at nearly all query levels.
4.2 BLACK-BOX ATTACK ON IMAGENET
We randomly divided the ImageNet validation set into two parts, containing 49000 and 1000 images
respectively. The first part was used as the training data for the generator G, and the second part was
used for evaluating the attacks. We evaluated the efficiency of all adversarial attacks on VGG19
(Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014), Resnet34 (He et al., 2016), DenseNet121 (Huang et al., 2017) and
MobilenetV2 (Sandler et al., 2018). All networks were downloaded using torchvision package. We
set ε = 0.03125.
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Table 1: Success rate and average queries of un-targeted attack on MNIST. ε = 0.2
Attack ConvNet1 ConvNet2 FCNet
Success Queries Success Queries Success Queries
NES 97.88% 4380 90.32% 5428 99.98% 1183
Trans-NESPGD 98.65% 2113 90.22% 4691 99.99% 818
Trans-NESFGSM 98.34% 3592 91.32% 4218 99.99% 1540
AutoZOOM 93.39% 5874 91.21% 2645 99.69% 823
P-RGF 68.53% 16135 39.85% 29692 90.42% 8289
Trans-P-RGF 66.34% 16428 27.57% 35576 68.39% 18818
TREMBA 98.00% 1064 92.63% 1359 99.75% 470
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Figure 1: Success rate of un-targeted attack at different query levels for undefended MNIST models.
Following (Liu et al., 2016), we used an ensemble (VGG16, Resnet18, Squeezenet (Iandola et al.,
2016) and Googlenet (Szegedy et al., 2015)) as the source model to improve transferablity (Liu et al.,
2016) for both targeted and un-targeted attack. TREMBA, Trans-NES, P-RGF and Trans-P-RGF
all used the same source model for fair comparison. We chose several target class. Here, we show
the result of attacking class 0 (tench) in Table 2 and Figure 2. And we leave the result of attacking
other classes in Appendix A.1. The average queries for TREMBA is about 1000 while nearly all the
average queries for other methods are more than 6000. TREMBA also achieves much lower queries
for un-targeted attack on ImageNet. The result is shown in Appendix A.2 due to space limitation.
And we also compared TREMBA with CombOpt (Moon et al., 2019) in the Appendix A.9.
Figure 3 shows the adversarial perturbations of different methods. Unlike adversarial perturbations
produced by PGD, the perturbations of TREMBA reflect some high level semantic patterns of
the targeted class such as the fish scale. As neural networks usually capture such patterns for
classification, the adversarial perturbation of TREMBA would be more easy to transfer than the
noise-like perturbation produced by PGD. Therefore TREMBA can search very effectively for the
target network. More examples of perturbations of TREMBA are shown in Appendix A.3.
Choice of ensemble: We performed attack on different ensembles of source model, which is shown
in Appendix A.4. TREMBA outperforms the other methods in different ensemble model. And more
source networks lead to better transferability for TREMBA, Trans-NES and Trans-P-RGF.
Varying ε: We also changed ε and performed attack on ε = 0.02 and ε = 0.04. As shown
in Appendix A.5, TREMBA still outperforms the other methods despite using the G trained on
ε = 0.03125. We also show the result of TREMBA for commonly used ε = 0.05.
Sample size and dimension the embedding space: To justify the choice of sample size, we per-
formed a hyperparameter sweep over b and the result is shown in Appendix A.6. And we also changed
the dimension of the embedding space for AutoZOOM and Trans-P-RGF. As shown in Appendix
A.7, the performance gain of TREMBA does not purely come from the diminishing of dimension of
the embedding space.
4.3 BLACK-BOX ATTACK ON DEFENDED MODELS
This section presents the results for attacking defended networks. We performed un-targeted attack
on two SOTA defense methods on CIFAR10 and ImageNet. MNIST is not studied since it is already
6
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Table 2: Success rate and average queries of black-box targeted attack on ImageNet. Targeted class is
class 0 (tench). ε = 0.03125
Attack VGG19 Resnet34 DenseNet121 MobilenetV2
Success Queries Success Queries Success Queries Success Queries
NES 94.86% 12283 93.89% 14418 95.65% 12538 97.76% 10276
Trans-NESPGD 96.26% 6854 95.97% 8737 96.59% 8627 98.04% 9375
Trans-NESFGSM 90.85% 12885 91.81% 14090 93.61% 12859 97.48% 9983
AutoZOOM 25.80% 40195 26.25% 39681 31.98% 37628 27.03% 39689
P-RGF 96.12% 6951 90.28% 10221 91.84% 11563 88.94% 14596
Trans-P-RGF 98.06% 2262 93.61% 6309 94.69% 7263 91.60% 10048
TREMBA 98.47% 853 96.38% 1206 98.50% 1124 99.16% 1210
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Figure 2: The success rate of black-box adversarial targeted attack at different query levels for
ImageNet models. The targeted class is tench
Target Class TREMBA AutoZOOM Trans-NESPGD Trans-P-RGF
Figure 3: Visualization of adversarial perturbations targeted at tench
robust against very strong white-box attacks. For CIFAR10, the defense model was going through
PGD minimax training (Madry et al., 2018). We directly used their model as the source network2,
denoted by WResnet. To test whether these methods can transfer to a defended network with a
different architecture, we trained a defended ResNeXt (Xie et al., 2017) using the same method. For
ImageNet, we used the SOTA model3 from (Xie et al., 2018). We used "ResNet152 Denoise" as the
source model and transfered adversarial perturbations to the most robust "ResNeXt101 DenoiseAll".
Following the previous settings, we set ε = 0.03125 for both CIFAR10 and ImageNet.
As shown in Table 3, TREMBA achieves higher success rates with lower number of queries. TREMBA
achieves about 10% improvement of success rate while the average queries are reduced by more
than 50% on ImageNet and by 80% on CIFAR10. The curves in Figure 4(a) and 4(b) show detailed
behaviors. The performance of AutoZOOM surpasses Trans-NES on defended models. We suspect
that low-frequency adversarial perturbations produced by AutoZOOM will be more suitable to fool
the defended models than the regular networks. However, the patterns learned by AutoZOOM are
still worse than adversarial patterns learned by TREMBA from the source network.
2https://github.com/MadryLab/cifar10_challenge
3https://github.com/facebookresearch/ImageNet-Adversarial-Training
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Table 3: Success rate of average queries of black-box un-targeted attack on defended CIFAR10 and
ImageNet model. Source network is WResNet and ResNet152 Denoise.
Attack CIFAR10 ResneXt ImageNet RexneXt101 DenoiseAll
Success Queries Success Queries
NES 32.17% 24521 29.72% 26526
Trans-NESPGD 32.92% 20735 32.84% 20446
Trans-NESFGSM 33.17% 20873 33.66% 18547
AutoZOOM 33.70% 14870 38.75% 14605
P-RGF 22.37% 25818 32.51% 17926
Trans-P-RGF 20.88% 27222 31.03% 19262
TREMBA 42.73% 2528 49.59% 5985
TREMBAOSP 41.56% 4994 50.41% 4771
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(a) CIFAR10
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(b) ImageNet
Figure 4: The success rate at different query levels for defended CIFAR10 and ImageNet models.
(a)CIFAR10; (b)ImageNet.
Table 4: Success rate and average queries of un-targeted attack of 10 images on Google Vision API.
Method NES AutoZOOM Trans-NESPGD P-RGF Trans-P-RGF TREMBA
Success 70.00% 20.00% 70.00% 50.00% 60.00% 90.00%
Queries 245 410 114 324 167 8
An optimized starting point for TREMBA: z0 = E(x) is already a good starting point for attacking
undefended networks. However, the capability of generator is limited for defended networks (Wang
& Yu, 2019). Therefore, z0 may not be the best starting point we can get from the defended source
network. To enhance the usefulness of the starting point, we optimized z on the source network by
gradient descent and found
z∗0 = argmin
z
max
(
Fs(ε tanh(D(z)) + x)y −max
j 6=yi
Fs(ε tanh(D(z)) + x)j ,−κ
)
. (5)
The method is denoted by TREMBAOSP (TREMBA with optimized starting point). Figure 4 shows
TREMBAOSP has higher success rate at small query levels, which means its starting point is better
than TREMBA.
4.4 ATTACK GOOGLE CLOUD VISION API
We also attacked the Google Cloud Vision API, which was much harder to attack than the single
neural network. Therefore we set ε = 0.05 and perform un-targeted attack on the API, changing the
top1 label to whatever is not on top1 before. We chose 10 images for the ImageNet dataset and set
query limit to be 500 due to high cost to use the API. As shown Table 4, TREMBA achieves much
higher accuracy success rate and lower number of queries. We show the example of successfully
attacked image in Appendix A.8.
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5 CONCLUSION
We propose a novel method, TREMBA, to generate likely adversarial patterns for an unknown
network. The method contains two stages: (1) training an encoder-decoder to generate adversarial
perturbations for the source network; (2) search adversarial perturbations on the low-dimensional
embedding space of the generator for any unknown target network. Compared with SOTA methods,
TREMBA learns an embedding space that is more transferable across different network architectures.
It achieves two to six times improvements in black-box adversarial attacks on MNIST and ImageNet
and it is especially efficient in performing targeted attack. Furthermore, TREMBA demonstrates
great capability in attacking defended networks, resulting in a nearly 10% improvement on the attack
success rate, with two to six times of reductions in the number of queries. TREMBA opens up
new ways to combine transfer-based and score-based attack methods to achieve higher efficiency in
searching adversarial examples.
For targeted attack, TREMBA requires different generators to attack different classes. We believe
methods from conditional image generation (Mirza & Osindero, 2014) may be combined with
TREMBA to form a single generator that could attack multiple targeted classes. We leave it as a
future work.
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A EXPERIMENT RESULT
A.1 TARGETED ATTACK ON IMAGENET
Figure 9 shows result of the targeted attack on dipper, American chameleon, night snake, ruffed
grouse and black swan. TREMBA achieves much higher success rate than other methods at almost
all queries level.
A.2 UN-TARGETED ATTACK ON IMAGENET
We used the same source model from targeted attack as the source model for un-targeted attack.
We report our evaluation results in Table 5 and Figure 5. Compared with Trans-P-RGF, TREMBA
reduces the number of queries by more than a half in ResNet34, DenseNet121 and MobilenetV2.
Searching in the embedding space of generator remains very effective even when the target network
architecture differs significantly from the networks in the source model.
Table 5: Success rate and average queries of un-targeted attack on ImageNet. ε = 0.03125
Attack VGG19 Resnet34 DenseNet121 MobilenetV2
Success Queries Success Queries Success Queries Success Queries
NES 100% 924 100% 1255 100% 1235 99.86% 872
Trans-NESPGD 100% 441 100% 827 100% 838 100% 733
Trans-NESFGSM 100% 586 100% 982 100% 961 100% 648
AutoZOOM 94.18% 5184 96.25% 3754 94.56% 4567 95.38% 4213
P-RGF 100% 277 99.72% 635 100% 709 99.72% 730
Trans-P-RGF 100% 130 99.86% 371 99.18% 806 99.86% 522
TREMBA 100% 88 100% 183 100% 172 100% 61
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Figure 5: The success rate of un-targeted black-box adversarial attack at different query levels for
undefended ImageNet models.
A.3 VISUALIZATION OF TARGETED PERTURBATION
Figure 10 shows some examples of adversarial perturbations produced by TREMBA. The first column
is one image of the target class and other columns are examples of perturbations (amplified by 10
times). It is easy to discover some features of the target class in the adversarial perturbation such as
the feather for birds and the body for snakes.
A.4 EXPERIMENTS ON DIFFERENT ENSEMBLES
We chose two more source ensemble models for evaluation. The first ensemble contains VGG16 and
Squeezenet. And the second ensemble is consist of VGG16, Squeezenet and Googlenet. Figure 6
shows our result for targeted attack for ImageNet. We only compared Trans-NESPGD and Trans-P-
RGF since they are the best variants from Trans-NES and P-RGF.
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Figure 6: We show the success rate at different query levels for targeted attack for different ensem-
ble source networks. V represents VGG16; S represents Squeezenet; G represents Googlenet; R
represents Resnet18
A.5 VARYING ε
We chose ε = 0.02 and ε = 0.04 and performed targeted attack on ImageNet. Although TREMBA
used the same model that is trained on ε = 0.03125, it still outperformed other methods, which shows
that TREMBA can also generalize to different strength of adversarial attack with different ε.
For the commonly used ε = 0.05, TREMBA also performs well. The results are shown in Table 6,
Table 7, and Figure 8.
A.6 VARYING SAMPLE SIZE
We performed a hyperparameter sweep over b on Densenet121 on un-targeted attack on ImageNet.
b = 20 may not be the best choice Trans-NES, but it is not the best for TREMBA, either. Generally,
the performance is not very sensitive to b, and TREMBA will also outperform other methods even if
we fine-tune the sample size for all the methods.
A.7 DIMENSION OF THE EMBEDDING SPACE
We slightly changed the architecture of the autoencoder by adding max pooling layers and changing
the number of filters and perform un-targeted attack on ImageNet. More specifically, we added
additional max pooling layers after the first and the fourth convolution layers and changed the number
of filters of the last layer in the encoder to be 8. Thus, the dimension of the embedding space would
be 8× 8× 8. And we also changed the factor of bilinear sampling in the decoder. The remaining
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(a) Targeted Attack ε = 0.02
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(b) Targeted Attack ε = 0.04
Figure 7: We show the success rate at different query levels for attack at different ε for ImageNet.
Table 6: Success rate and average queries of un-targeted attack on ImageNet. ε = 0.05
Attack VGG19 Resnet34 DenseNet121 MobilenetV2
Success Queries Success Queries Success Queries Success Queries
NES 100% 651 100% 850 100% 840 99.86% 640
Trans-NESPGD 100% 74 100% 196 100% 235 100% 169
Trans-NESFGSM 100% 232 100% 401 100% 361 100% 272
AutoZOOM 99.72% 1743 99.58% 1481 99.32% 1730 99.29% 1672
P-RGF 100% 178 100% 328 100% 436 100% 402
Trans-P-RGF 100% 44 99.44% 418 98.09% 1049 100% 157
TREMBA 100% 8 100% 27 100% 19 100% 8
Table 7: Success rate and average queries of targeted attack on ImageNet. ε = 0.05
Attack VGG19 Resnet34 DenseNet121 MobilenetV2
Success Queries Success Queries Success Queries Success Queries
NES 99.03% 6364 98.89% 8003 99.32% 7525 99.72$ 5610
Trans-NESPGD 99.31% 1968 99.31% 3549 99.46% 3731 99.86% 3223
Trans-NESFGSM 99.03% 4997 98.33% 7298 98.23% 6874 99.16% 5034
AutoZOOM 51.04% 30032 52.36% 28547 60.00% 25836 53.78% 28356
P-RGF 99.17% 3704 98.05% 5498 97.96% 5769 98.17% 6896
Trans-P-RGF 99.58% 662 99.31% 1896 99.05% 2267 99.16% 3192
TREMBA 99.72% 285 99.44% 443 99.72% 224 99.72% 422
settings are the same in Appendix A.2. As shown in Table 9, this autoencoder is even worse than the
original autoencoder despite small dimension of the embedding space. In addition, we also changed
to dimension of the data-dependent prior of Trans-P-RGF to match the dimension of TREMBA,
whose performance is also not better than before. They show that simply diminishing the size of the
embedding space may not lead to better performance. The performance gain of TREMBA comes
beyond the effect of diminishing the dimension of the embedding space.
A.8 EXAMPLES OF ATTACKING GOOGLE CLOUD VISION API
Figure 11 shows one example of attacking Google Cloud Vision API. TREMBA successfully make
the shark to be classified as green. Compared with Trans-NESPGD, TREMBA hugely changes the
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(a) Un-targeted Attack ε = 0.05
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(b) Targeted Attack ε = 0.05
Figure 8: We show the success rate at different query levels for targeted and un-targeted attack at
ε = 0.05 for ImageNet.
Table 8: Hyperparameter sweep over b on Densenet121 for un-targeted attack on ImageNet
Sweep over b b = 10 b = 30 b = 40 b = 50
Success Queries Success Queries Success Queries Success Queries
NES 100% 1323 100% 1284 100% 1433 100% 1639
Trans-NESPGD 100% 915 100% 791 100% 707 100% 639
Trans-NESFGSM 100% 1037 100% 916 100% 879 100% 886
AutoZOOM 90.9% 6052 96.2% 4148 97.1% 4066 97.3% 4366
P-RGF 99.73% 717 99.86% 860 99.86% 949 99.86% 1095
Trans-P-RGF 98.50% 1139 99.86% 479 99.86% 487 100% 427
TREMBA 100% 150 100% 205 100% 274 100% 299
Table 9: Change of dimension of the embedding space of AutoZOOM. The task is un-targeted attack
on ImageNet.
Attack VGG19 Resnet34 DenseNet121 MobilenetV2
Success Queries Success Queries Success Queries Success Queries
AutoZOOM 64.35% 19684 71.94% 16931 68.44% 17871 71.15% 16134
Trans-P-RGF 99.86% 194 99.58% 508 99.59% 610 99.58% 705
labels of the image. It is hard to say the overall classification of Trans-NESPGD is wrong. However,
the labels of TREMBA are definitely not correct.
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Figure 9: The success rate at different query levels for attack targeted at different class. Targeted
classes are: (a)Dipper; (b)American chameleon; (c)Night snake; (d)Ruffed grouse; (e)Black swan
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Figure 10: Visualization of adversarial perturbations for targeted attack on ImageNet. The first
column shows one example of the target class. Other columns show the adversarial perturbations.
(a) Origin Image (b) TREMBA (c) Trans-NESPGD
Figure 11: One example of adversarial image for attacking Google Cloud Vision API
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Table 10: Comparision between CombOpt and TREMBA for un-targeted attack on Imagenet.
Attack VGG19 Resnet34 DenseNet121 MobilenetV2
Success Queries Success Queries Success Queries Success Queries
CombOpt 100% 567 100% 499 100% 569 100% 522
TREMBA 100% 88 100% 183 100% 172 100% 61
Table 11: Comparision between CombOpt and TREMBA for targeted attack on Imagenet.
Attack VGG19 Resnet34 DenseNet121 MobilenetV2
Success Queries Success Queries Success Queries Success Queries
CombOpt 93.76% 9767 94.86% 8024 97.41% 6970 96.92% 8575
TREMBA 98.47% 853 96.38% 1206 98.50% 1124 99.16% 1210
A.9 COMPARISION BETWEEN TREMBA AND COMBOPT
CombOpt is one of the SOTA score-based black-box attack. We compared our method with it on the
targeted and un-targeted attack on Imagenet. The targeted attack is 0 and ε = 0.03125. As shown in
Table 10 and Table 11, TREMBA requires much lower queries than CombOpt. It demonstrates the
great improvement by combining the transfer-based and score-based attack.
B ARCHITECTURE OF CLASSIFIERS AND GENERATORS
B.1 CLASSIFIER
Table 12: Model architectures for the MNIST
ConvNet1 ConvNet2 FCNet
Conv(64, 5, 5)+ReLU Conv(16, 3, 3)+ReLU FC(512)+ReLU
MaxPool(2,2) Conv(16, 3, 3)+ReLU FC(10)+Softmax
Conv(64, 5, 5)+ReLU MaxPool(2,2)
MaxPool(2,2) Conv(32, 3, 3)+ReLU
Dropout(0.25) Conv(32, 3, 3)+ReLU
FC(128)+ReLU Conv(32, 3, 3)+ReLU
Dropout(0.5) MaxPool(2,2)
FC(10)+Softmax FC(512)+ReLU
FC(10)+Softmax
Table 12 lists the architectures of ConvNet1, ConvNet2 and FCNet. The architecture of ResNeXt
used in CIFAR10 is from https://github.com/prlz77/ResNeXt.pytorch. We set the
depth to be 20, the cardinality to be 8 and the widen factor to be 4. Other architectures of classifiers
are specified in the corresponding paper.
B.2 GENERATOR
Table 13 lists the architectures of generator for three datasets. For AutoZOOM, we find our architec-
tures are not suitable and use the same generators in the corresponding paper.
C HYPERPARAMETERS
C.1 TRAINING GENERATOR
We trained the generators with learning rate starting at 0.01 and decaying half every 50 epochs. The
whole training process was 500 epochs. The batch size was determined by the memory of GPU.
Specifically, we set batch size to be 256 for MNIST and CIFAR10 defense model, 64 for ImageNet
model. All large κ will work well for our method and we chose κ = 200.0. All the experiments were
performed using pytorch on NVIDIA RTX 2080Ti.
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Table 13: Architectures of encoder and decoder. ConvReLUBN and DeconvReLUBN represent
convolution or deconvolution followed by ReLU and batch normalization. The parameters (c,m, n)
used in ConvReLUBN or DeconvReLUBN mean c channels with m× n kernel size. MaxPool(m,n)
represents max pooling with (m,n) kernel size and (m,n) stride.
MNIST CIFAR10 ImageNet
Encoder
ConvReLUBN(16,3,3) ConvReLUBN(16,3,3) ConvReLUBN(16,3,3)
ConvReLUBN(32,3,3) ConvReLUBN(32,3,3) ConvReLUBN(32,3,3)
ConvReLUBN(32,3,3) ConvReLUBN(32,3,3) MaxPool(2,2)
MaxPool(2,2) MaxPool(2,2) ConvReLUBN(64,3,3)
ConvReLUBN(32,3,3) ConvReLUBN(32,3,3) ConvReLUBN(64,3,3)
ConvReLUBN(16,3,3) ConvReLUBN(32,3,3) MaxPool(2,2)
ConvReLUBN(2,3,3) ConvReLUBN(8,3,3) ConvReLUBN(128,3,3)
MaxPool(2,2) MaxPool(2,2) ConvReLUBN(128,3,3)
MaxPool(2,2)
ConvReLUBN(32,3,3)
ConvReLUBN(8,3,3)
MaxPool(2,2)
Decoder
ConvReLUBN(32,3,3) ConvReLUBN(32,3,3) ConvReLUBN(32,3,3)
ConvReLUBN(32,3,3) ConvReLUBN(32,3,3) DeconvReLUBN(64,3,3)
DeconvReLUBN(64,3,3) DeconvReLUBN(64,3,3) ConvReLUBN(128,3,3)
ConvReLUBN(64,3,3) ConvReLUBN(64,3,3) DeconvReLUBN(128,3,3)
ConvReLUBN(64,3,3) ConvReLUBN(64,3,3) ConvReLUBN(128,3,3)
DeconvReLUBN(16,3,3) DeconvReLUBN(16,3,3) DeconvReLUBN(64,3,3)
Conv(1,1,1) Conv(3,1,1) ConvReLUBN(32,3,3)
DeconvReLUBN(16,3,3)
ConvReLUBN(3,1,1)
C.2 EVALUATION
Table 14 to 19 list the hyperparameters for all the algorithms. The learning rate was fine-tuned for all
the algorithms. We set sample size b = 20 for all the algorithms for fair comparisons.
Table 14: Hyperparameters for NES
MNIST CIFAR10 ImageNet
Un-targeted Targeted Un-targeted Defense
Sample size (b) 20 20 20 20 20
Learning rate (η) 0.2 0.05 0.1 0.05 0.1
Table 15: Hyperparameters for Trans-NESPGD and Trans-NESFGSM. White-box iteration, white-box
margin and white-box learning rate mean the hyperparameters for generating the starting point on the
source network for Trans-NESPGD.
MNIST CIFAR10 ImageNet
Un-targeted Targeted Un-targeted Defense
Sample size (b) 20 20 20 20 20
Learning rate (η) 0.2 0.05 0.1 0.05 0.1
White-box iteration 50 100 50 50 100
White-box margin(κ) 100 100 100 100 100
White-box learning rate 0.05 0.1 0.01 0.005 0.1
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Table 16: Hyperparameters for AutoZOOM.
MNIST CIFAR10 ImageNet
Un-targeted Targeted Un-targeted Defense
Sample size (b) 20 20 20 20 20
Learning rate (η) 5.0 20.0 5.0 3.0 5.0
Table 17: Hyperparameters for P-RGF and Trans-P-RGF.
MNIST CIFAR10 ImageNet
Un-targeted Targeted Un-targeted Defense
Sample size (b) 20 20 20 20 20
Learning rate (η) 0.1 0.05 0.005 0.003 0.005
White-box iteration 50 100 50 50 100
White-box margin(κ) 100 100 100 100 100
White-box learning rate 0.05 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.1
Table 18: Hyperparameters for TREMBA.
MNIST CIFAR10 ImageNet
Un-targeted Targeted Un-targeted Defense
Sample size (b) 20 20 20 20 20
Learning rate (η) 0.3 2.0 5.0 3.0 5.0
Table 19: Hyperparameters for TREMBAOSP .
CIFAR10 Defense ImageNet Defense
Sample size (b) 20 20
Learning rate (η) 2.0 5.0
White-box iteration 100 100
White-box margin(κ) 100 100
White-box learning rate 1.0 2.0
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